See what I meant about failure proofing?
Praful Bidwai writes about a tale of two visits, one of them a “success” and the other one a “failure”. The “failure” was Richard Armitage’s visit to India and Pakistan. The “success” was – I am not making this up – the visit by Pakistani MPs to India. Why is one a success and the other a failure? Because Bidwai says so.
Also because the MPs’ visit was organised by “Pakistan-India Peoples’ Forum for Peace and Democracy?; which is a “culmination of a number of citizens’ initiatives launched more than a decade ago amidst soured state-to-state relations following the outbreak of the azaadi movement in the Kashmir Valley”
So ten years of efforts have culminated in a visit by MPs. But it is not yet a failure.
But “Begging America to pressure Pakistan was the only “strategy” India used in the 15 years leading to Pokharan-II and Chagai” . This strategy is a failure by definition, though the article itself mentions some (very very short term) successes.
Bidwai also propounds the usual bromide.
Indians and Pakistanis get on extraordinarily well with one another at an individual level. Despite their different political evolution, the two societies share much in their culture, languages, music, literature, and in day-to-day interaction, gestures, even people’s body language. This realisation, especially through personal experience, dramatically breaks down barriers which are essential to maintaining a permanent state of hostility. It can increase the trust and good faith necessary for fruitful negotiations between governments
In the first place, there is no way to disprove the above statement. He doesn’t actually back his statement by any any statistical evidence, but even if it turns out that Indians and Pakistanis, on an average, actually viscerally hate each other, he can always claim that it is because they’ve been taught to do so by their governments (and by fabricated evidence of terrorists killing Indians, perhaps)
In the second place, even if it is true that Pakistanis have nothing but love and affection towards Indians, what are the policy implications of this fact? Are we supposed to sit and wait for a pro-India revolution to topple the Pakistani dictatorship before there is peace in Kashmir? Or are we supposed to foment such a revolution? To ask the question is to actually set criteria for success, and of course, risk failure.
It turns out that “people-to-people” exchanges still require government action to succeed. Specifically, Indian government action. Or in Bidwai’s own words:
Therefore, both India and Pakistan will do well to announce unilateral concessions, CBMs and steps to promote goodwill
Notice the smart choice of words? If both do it together, it won’t be “unilateral”. What he actually means is that India should do it unilaterally, but dressing the statement as an advice to both countries, is a tactic worthy of a weasel.
Also notice the smart choice of scare quotes. There are scare quotes around “cross-border” but none around “azaadi”.
I am not arguing that Armitage’s visit was a success of any sort, just that my theory of pacifism being failure-proof has been vindicated